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Abstract : This is the second chapter of a book, Financial Regulation in the Global Economy,
written with Robert Litan.  In this chapter we show how technological advances--dramatic
reductions in transportation, telecommunications and computation costs--are creating an
increasingly integrated financial market that ignores national boundaries.  First we examine
the effect of these technological advances on users of financial services and regulators of
financial services.  Then we document the increasing volume of international financial
transactions and evaluate the extent to which financial prices are integrated across
countries.  We conclude by highlighting the risks that are the consequence of increasing
international financial integration and pose a challenge to managers of financial institutions
and regulators.International Financial Integration: The Continuing Process
Richard J. Herring
Technological advances have reduced the costs of cross-border transactions in all
sectors of the economy. The dramatic reductions in transportation, telecommunications and
computation costs shown in figure 1 have greatly increased the ease with which firms can
bridge the natural barriers of time and space that separate national markets. Nowhere has
technology had a greater impact on cross-border activity than in the financial services
sector.
The fundamental function of financial service firms is to gather and process
information. The sharp reductions in the costs of telecommunications and in the costs of
compiling, storing and analyzing information, have broadened the geographic domains over
which financial service institutions and their customers make decisions. Advances in
computer hardware and software have dramatically reduced the costs of collecting and
analyzing data, initiating and confirming transactions, clearing and settling payments, and
monitoring financial flows through management information and accounting systems.
Indeed, technological advances have made it possible for sophisticated firms to raise or
invest funds, exchange currencies, or change the attributes of assets around the globe,
around the clock.
In this chapter we sketch the impact of these technological advances on users of
financial services, providers of financial services and regulators of financial services in the
industrialized countries that have been most affected by these advances. Next we document
the increasing volume of international financial transactions. Finally, we evaluate the extent2
to which financial prices are integrated across countries. In short we demonstrate how
technology is creating an increasingly integrated financial market that ignores national
boundaries.
Impact on Consumers
Although the same customer may be both a provider of funds and a user of funds, it
is useful to distinguish the two roles when assessing the impact of technological advances
on customer behavior. Users of funds have sought to broaden their funding base
internationally as a means of enhancing their liquidity and lowering their costs.
Multinational corporations and governments have financial needs sufficiently large to justify
substantial search costs to identify the cheapest source of funds. Some of these needs
continue to be satisfied by traditional international bank loans, albeit often in the form of
new kinds of loan contracts that include a variety of embedded options. But increasingly,
large borrowers have found that they can place issues of securities in markets more cheaply
than they can borrow from international banks. Figure 2 shows that since 1983, direct
issues of securities have dominated international flows of credit intermediated through
banks.
This trend has been facilitated in part by an improved flow of information. News
services provide a continuous flow of information relevant to valuing securities. In
addition, a number of vendors provide analytic software to transform raw financial data into
a format useful for making decisions. Security analysts and ratings agencies continually
prod borrowers to improve their disclosure practices. Both security analysts and ratings
agencies have invested significant resources in analyzing a wider range of foreign
borrowers to help potential investors make better decisions. Accountants and regulatory3
authorities in several countries have also required that a greater range of data be disclosed
on a more timely basis. Moreover, borrowers who are eager to tap broader, international
sources of savings have voluntarily disclosed more data relevant to evaluating their
creditworthiness.
These trends have generally favored investment banks and universal banks that have
specialized in facilitating the access of borrowers to world financial markets. But
commercial banks have also participated in the process, sometimes with striking success.
Because commercial banks in the United States and Japan have had broader securities
powers outside their domestic markets,
1 they have been particularly active in helping their
clients gain access to foreign markets. In addition, some of the largest corporations have
formed in-house banks to serve their international financial needs.
Financial institutions have introduced a variety of innovations to reduce transactions
costs and broaden the range of options available to borrowers in national and international
financial markets. In general these innovations have permitted institutions to unbundle and
repackage financial attributes so that both borrowers and lenders end up with the financial
instruments they prefer and risks are redistributed to investors who are most willing to bear
them. For example, a firm that wants a ten-year, floating-rate, U.S. dollar-denominated
loan may find that the cheapest alternative is to issue a ten-year, fixed-rate, Australian
1This is one of many examples of the attempt of regulatory authorities to enhance the
international competitiveness of their regulatees. As Dale notes, the Federal Reserve Board’s
“willingness to pare down the constraints imposed by Glass-Steagall reflects, among other
considerations, the U.S. regulatory authorities’ concern to maintain the international
competitiveness of the U.S. banking system.”
institutions can combine banking and
Similarly as Dale observes “Japanese financial
securities business in foreign financial centers [even
though] they are denied this privilege in their home market.” Richard Dale, International
Banking Deregulation, The Great Banking Experiment, (Oxford: Blackwell Finance, 1992),
pp. 70 and 90.4
dollar-denominated bond combined with a currency swap from Australian dollars into U.S.
dollars and an interest rate swap from fixed interest rates to floating interest rates. The
information systems and analytic capacity to compare such borrowing alternatives are
formidable; they require virtually instantaneous information about global developments that
can be factored into investment, funding and credit evaluation decisions. But sophisticated
international borrowers have come to expect that they can select from an extremely broad
menu that includes a multitude of indirect ways to achieve the desired result.
Large customers have also demanded a variety of noncredit services to facilitate
international transactions. These include global management of cash flows through
integrated computer networks; global custody, recordkeeping and trustee services for
pension, savings, and other sorts of employee benefit plans worldwide; and fiduciary and
agency services in connection with capital and debt financing for entities throughout the
world.
Providers of funds have also become increasingly international in their outlook. In
almost every major country, more and more funds are being managed by a smaller number
of decisionmakers (see figure 3). Institutional investors -- pension funds, insurance
companies, and mutual funds -- have come to dominate financial markets. This trend is
particularly apparent in the United States. Forty years ago individuals held ninety percent
of corporate equity. Even ten years ago, individuals owned well over two-thirds of
corporate equity. Today, institutional investors control more than half of the shares of
American public corporations.
2
2Wharton School and the New York Stock Exchange, The Policy Implications of
Stockownership Patterns, A Conference Summary and Research Agenda, Rodney L. White
Center for Financial Research, (1993), p. 1.5
Institutional investors often behave differently than individual investors. They are
able to reduce their per unit transactions costs relative to individual investors by pooling
transactions, negotiating commissions, and, on occasion, by dealing directly with issuers of
securities. They have the capability to follow market developments closely throughout the
world, to analyze investment prospects, and to execute decisions promptly. Moreover, they
are under intense pressure to earn competitive risk-adjusted returns. Just as ratings agencies
have arisen to help investors analyze the issuers of securities, advisory services have also
developed to help savers evaluate the performance of institutional investors.
Increasingly, institutional investors are diversifying internationally as a means of
boosting their returns and reducing the volatility of their portfolios.
3 Although prudential
regulations have constrained the amounts some institutional investors can invest abroad,
these restrictions are being relaxed. Regulators are becoming convinced that, contrary to
their earlier presumptions, careful international diversification can actually enhance the
safety and soundness of portfolios managed by institutional investors.
Impacts on Financial Service Institutions
In order to meet the demand for international financial services, financial institutions
have invested heavily in the technical infrastructure to compete effectively in international
financial markets. In addition, they have established offices in foreign financial centers.
By 1986, foreign banks operated more than 600 offices in the United States, triple the
3Morningstar Mutual Funds, an advisory service that compares the performance of hundreds
of mutual funds, observed that even within the category ‘domestic fund.’ “Only one domestic
fund in four now fails to own a foreign stock.” Indeed a substantial number of equity funds
including the Fidelity Magellan Fund and the Vanguard/Windsor Fund -- two of the largest
actively managed equity mutual funds -- hold more than 10 percent of their equity in non-U.S.
issues. Morningstar Mutual Funds, vol. 20, issue 3, July 9, 1993, p. 1.6
number from the mid-seventies. And more than 400 foreign banks operated in London, a
more than four-fold increase from the mid-seventies.
4  The number of foreign banking
offices increased three-fold in Japan and nearly four-fold in Germany from 1970 to 1985.
5
This competition is largely focused on wholesale, institutional markets because foreign
financial institutions have usually found it difficult to acquire large, local retail bases.
Foreign banks have made deep inroads in several major markets. In the United States
foreign banks gained nearly a 45 percent share of the market for commercial loans by 1991.
6
These competitive inroads have undoubtedly been facilitated by technology. For
example, fax machines have enabled Japanese banks to respond quickly to U.S. loan
customers. The U.S. office of a Japanese bank can take a loan application during the U.S.
business day, fax the information to Japan where the loan application can be evaluated
during the Japanese business day and the decision can be faxed back to the United States to
communicate to the loan applicant by the start of the next U.S. business day.
Just as direct investment in the manufacturing sector often embodies transfers of
technology, foreign financial establishments often introduce financial innovations in local
markets. European banks have enhanced the quality of foreign exchange services available
to U.S. residents and U.S. banks have introduced derivative instruments in several markets
abroad.
4J.P. Morgan & Co. Incorporated,  Annual Report 1986.
5Bank for International Settlements, Recent Innovations in International Banking, (Basle,
April 1986), p. 151.
6This estimate made by McCauley and Seth combines loans made from U.S. offices of
foreign banks and loans extended from their off-shore offices. Robert N. McCauley and Rama
Seth, “Foreign Bank Credit to U.S. Corporations: The Implications of Offshore Loans,”
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, (Spring 1992), pp. 52.7
Increased competition among financial services firms has led to increased international
specialization of labor. Systems analysts and computer programmers in India are providing
services for financial firms in many other parts of the world. And Ireland, which has
invested substantial resources in developing a computer-literate work force, has become an
important exporter of back office services to several financial service firms in North
America.
Impacts on Regulators
Perhaps most important for the issues we address in this book, technological advances
have diminished the ability of financial regulators in each country to maintain more
burdensome regulations that increase the cost of financial services relative to that in other
countries. This has occurred in two ways. First, as noted, technological advances have
facilitated the unbundling and repackaging of individual financial products. Consequently,
regulations that prohibit one kind of activity can easily be circumvented by product
redesign to produce a close substitute. These financial innovations may occur in the
domestic market -- for example, the development of money market mutual funds. They
may also involve international financial transactions such as Eurodollar deposits or
off-shore commercial paper facilities.
Second, technology has undermined the significance of geo-political boundaries.
Regulation that distorts prices creates profit opportunities for customers of financial
institutions and financial institutions themselves. Institutions or their clients can often avoid
onerous regulation by moving the locus of activity to a more congenial regulatory domain.
In short, technology has allowed participants in the financial marketplace to engage in
“regulatory arbitrage.”8
Heightened global competition thus exposes differences in national regulatory
structures to an exacting market test. Regulatory policies designed to accomplish objectives
such as raising revenue or redistributing wealth from one sector of the economy to another
or from one class of institutions to another have become increasingly untenable as users of
financial services turn to foreign sources of supply whenever domestic financial products
are not competitively priced.
In recent decades several tax and regulatory initiatives have been more effective in
shifting the location of financial activity than in accomplishing the objective that the
regulation was intended to achieve. For example, the attempt by the United States to
impose an Interest Equalization Tax to discourage foreign borrowing in dollar capital
markets, led to creation of an active market in dollar-denominated bonds -- the Eurobond
market -- outside the regulatory domain of the United States. Similarly, during the 1960s
and 1970s, each time market interest rates rose above deposit interest rate ceilings in the
U.S., an enormous volume of dollar deposits shifted from the U.S. to Eurodollar centers.
When U.S. bank customers found they could not roll-over their Certificates of Deposit in
U.S. banks at the market rate of interest, many simply transferred their deposits to
Eurobanks -- often shell branches of their American banks -- but, located beyond the reach
of interest-rate ceiling regulations.
Examples of this phenomenon are apparent in other parts of the world as well. In the
early 1980s Japanese investors faced high tax rates on interest income, but no taxes on
capital gains. This led to a strong demand for zero-coupon Eurobonds until the Japanese9
tax laws were reformed.
7 In 1988 almost $11 billion of German investment funds flowed
into the Luxembourg bond market following the announcement of a German 10 percent
withholding tax to become effective January 1989. Likewise, the establishment of
organized markets for derivative instruments has been so inhibited in Germany by the
interpretation of gambling laws that most futures trading in German government bonds has
taken place in London. Similarly, the imposition of a transfer tax in the Swedish market
caused market activity to relocate to London. The tax mainly succeeded in shifting market
activity rather than in raising revenue for the government or dampening volatility in market
prices.
Of course, regulatory authorities often try to anticipate or respond to regulatory
arbitrage. International competition among national regulatory authorities is a long-standing
tradition
8; it has become more intense as the costs of traversing time and space have fallen.
In several important financial centers the regulatory authorities have reacted to competitive
pressures by relaxing regulations covering both financial markets and depository
institutions. Indeed, some countries have taken active measures to attract a larger share of
international business by improving the infrastructure to support financial services and by
virtually eliminating regulatory burdens on international financial transactions.
9 In
addition, several countries -- most notably Canada, France, New Zealand, and the United
7Staff Team, Exchange and Trade Relations and. Research Departments, International
Capital Markets, Developments and Prospects, International Monetary Fund, (April 1990), p. 65.
8For example, in the middle ages, the King of France tried to attract commercial and
financial business to Lyons by forbidding merchants to travel to the rival center, Geneva.
9Edward J. Kane, “How Market Forces Influence the Structure of Financial Regulation,”
Restructuring Banking and Financial Services in America, W. S. Haraf and R. M. Kushmeider,
eds., (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, 1987), pp. 343-82.10
Kingdom -- have relaxed traditional restrictions on the permissible scope of operations of
domestic depository institutions to permit them greater flexibility in responding to changing
market conditions.
10
The liberalization of domestic financial systems and the dismantling of capital
controls has often been attributed to the rise of conservative ideology. Indeed, the trend is
often associated with President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain. But in the United States the first important initiative to
phase-out interest rate ceilings, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) was introduced by and enacted during the Carter
Administration. Similarly, the deregulation efforts of the Conservative government in Great
Britain have been largely matched by the actions of the Socialist governments in other parts
of Europe. In short, market developments are at least as important as ideology in
motivating policymakers to change the financial regulatory landscape.
Regulatory competition has recently intensified because of the European Community’s
bold initiative to enhance the efficiency of financial regulation within the Community.
11
As we discuss again in chapter 4, the Second Banking Directive, approved in December
1989 by the European Parliament, insures that European institutions can choose to become
universal banks. European banks will be permitted to accept deposits, make long-term
loans, issue and underwrite corporate securities and take equity positions. The
10G. Bröker, Competition in Banking, (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 1989).
11Richard J. Herring, “92 and After: the International Supervisory Challenge,” World
Financial Markets After 1992, H. Genberg and A. Swoboda (eds.), (Kegan Paul International
1993).11
Community’s approach to harmonization of banking regulation among the member states,
which combines the adoption of a single banking license with the principles of mutual
recognition and home country control, will create a competitive dynamic which makes it
likely that the European regulatory system will remain flexible and efficient.
12 These
principles have been largely adopted in the directives covering investment services, life
assurance and nonlife insurance.
13
European financial institutions will have the freedom to select from regulatory
regimes in any of the current twelve member countries. This will cause each national
regulatory authority to assess carefully the competitive impact of its regulatory structure.
The approach deliberately encourages national regulatory authorities to compete, subject to
basic safety and soundness constraints, in providing the most efficient regulatory system.
As Sir Leon Brittan observed, “in one bound [the European Community] . . . has moved
from twelve fragmented and confusing structures of national (banking) regulation to a
single market of a size and simplicity unmatched anywhere else in the world.” He
emphasized that the motive was not “merely to benefit banks . . . [but] . . . to increase the
competitiveness of European industry by giving it access to the cheapest, most efficient,
and most innovative financial products in the world.
14 The European Community
estimated that financial integration would yield gains equal to one third to one half of the
12Sydney J. Key, “Mutual Recognition: Integration of the Financial Sector in the European
Community,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, (September 1989), pp. 591-609.
13Innes Fraser and Paul Mortimer-Lee, “The ECSingle Market in Financial Services,” Bank
of England Quarterly Bulletin, (February 1993), vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 92-97.
14Sir Leon Brittan, “Opening World Banking Markets,” transcript of a speech delivered at
the American Enterprise Institute, March 23, 1990.12
total benefits of completing the European single market initiative.
15
In sum, technological advance has had a powerful impact on international financial
integration. It has broadened the financial horizons of users of financial services and it has
enhanced the ability of financial institutions to provide international solutions to financial
problems. Regulators have faced a stark choice: they can regulate domestic financial
institutions heavily, but the main consequence is likely to be a migration of business away
from heavily regulated firms to less regulated domestic firms or foreign institutions.
Alternatively, rather than preside over the decline of their regulatees, regulators can
liberalize domestic rules and relax international capital controls. Most countries have opted
for the second course.
In the process, government policies have heightened international financial
competition and deepened international financial integration. The hope is that better
international integration of financial markets will facilitate the pricing and reallocation of a
broader range of risks thereby enhancing the international allocation of resources.
It is instructive, however, that the efforts at policy integration described thus far have
proceeded both unilaterally and multilaterally. Whether and to what extent future financial
regulatory policies should be coordinated across national boundaries is an issue we explore
more fully in subsequent chapters.
Expanding international flows of capital
Can the trends toward increased financial integration be quantified? Unfortunately, no
comprehensive measure of gross international financial flows exists, but there is little doubt
15M. Catinant, E. Eonnai, and A. Italianer, “The Competition of the International Market:
Results of Macroeconomic Model Simulations,” The Cost of Non-Europe, Commission of the
European Community, vol. 2, chap. 10, (1988).13
that cross-border flows have risen over the past two decades. International trade has
continued to grow faster than GNP (see figure 4). Thus even in the absence of the
technical advances and liberalization of regulation, the volume of international transactions
would have increased relative to GNP, if only to support the growth in world trade.
In fact international financial transactions have grown much faster than world trade.
One plausible, though admittedly imperfect proxy for the volume of international financial
transactions, is the value of payments cleared through the Clearing House Interbank
Payment System (CHIPS). CHIPS is the electronic payment system that transfers and
settles international transactions based on U.S. dollars, the paramount vehicle currency for
international finance and. commerce.
16 CHIPS handles over 90 percent of all dollar
payments moving among countries around the world including foreign exchange
transactions, Eurodollar transactions, Eurosecurities settlements, and international
disbursements of dollar-denominated loans.
17 As figure 5 shows, the dollar value of
clearings through CHIPS has grown much faster than the dollar value of world trade. By
1992, the average daily volume of transactions cleared through CHIPS was $942 billion.
16In the colorful prose of the CHIPS brochure, “the world is evolving into a single,
seamless financial market-place that functions around the clock. Decisions involving
megasums are communicated electronically in nanoseconds. And, in the overwhelming
majority of the transactions, the denominator is the U.S. dollar. . . . [CHIPS
clearing system in the United States for international transactions.” New York
is the central
Clearing House
Association, “From Sydney to Stockholm. From Tokyo to Toronto. From London to Lisbon
. . .,” Clearing House Interbank Payments System, (1986), p. 1.
17This measure presents a useful indicator of trends, but it cannot be regarded as a precise
measure of the volume of international financial transactions for several reasons. First, it
includes trade as well as financial transactions. Second, domestic U.S. transactions account for
a minor portion of the volume. Third, an estimated 10 percent of international dollar payments
do not flow through CHIPS. Fourth, although the dollar is usually the currency against which
any other currency is traded, this is not invariably the case. Moreover, as other currencies
become more important in international financial transactions -- displacing to some extent the
vehicle role of the dollar -- the flow of transactions through CHIPS understates the volume of
international transactions.14
The increasing volume of international financial flows can be seen in the rising
volume of foreign exchange trading in three major centers that have conducted surveys of
their foreign exchange markets during March of 1986, and April of 1989 and 1992 (figure
6). In each three year interval the increase has exceeded the rise in GDP and merchandise
trade. Undoubtedly a substantial part of the increase in foreign exchange turnover has been
generated by the rise in cross-border capital flows stimulated by the relaxation of capital
controls and continued deregulation of domestic financial markets. The Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) has combined the survey results from these three centers
with comparable surveys conducted in 23 other leading centers. After adjusting for
double-counting as well as for estimated gaps in reporting, the BIS estimates the global net
turnover in the world’s foreign exchange markets to have been $880 billion per business
day in April 1992.
18 This average daily turnover during a very placid period in the
foreign exchange markets was virtually identical to the total stock of official foreign
exchange reserves for all countries reported at the end of April 1992.
19
Figure 7 shows that the stock of international bank lending as reported by the Bank
for International Settlements also has grown steadily. Nonetheless, the rate of growth of
international bank lending has been eclipsed in the last decade by the growth in
international issues of securities and in derivative instruments.
International issues of bonds are graphed in figure 8. In figure 2 we saw that new
issues of international bonds began to exceed the flow of bank loans in 1983. Since that
18Bank for International Settlements, Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange Market
Activity in April 1992, Monetary and Economic Department, (Basle, March 1993).
19The stock of foreign
International Monetary
exchange reserves was SDR 648,330 million or $888,082 million.
Fund, International Financial Statistics, (July 1992).15
time they have continued to dominate new bank lending. Over the decade several kinds of
bonds were introduced that had equity-like characteristics. During periods when equity
prices were expected to rise, issuers found that they could reduce interest costs dramatically
by issuing convertible bonds or bonds with equity warrants attached. Japanese borrowers
made especially aggressive use of these instruments in the latter part of the decade. During
1989, equity-related issues accounted for more than 30 percent of all bonds issued on
international markets.
20
Cross-border flows of equities have become increasingly important over the last
decade as well (see figure 9). Professional traders continually monitor prices for the same
securities quoted on different markets to profit from price discrepancies. In addition,
investment managers attempt to exploit what they perceive to be valuation discrepancies for
comparable companies traded in different national markets. Gross cross-border equity
flows -- the sum of equity purchases and sales associated with international portfolio
investment -- have been well above $1 trillion per year since 1987. During 1989 gross
cross-border flow was equal to 14.8 percent of the world market capitalization.
21
The growth in derivative products has been perhaps the most remarkable feature of
international markets over the last five years (see figure 10). Interest rate swap contracts in
which two counterparties agree to exchange two different interest payment streams over
time -- one usually pays a fixed interest rate, the other, a floating interest rate -- account for
20Morris Goldstein, Donald J. Mathieson, and Timothy Lane, “Determinants and Systemic
Consequences of International Capital Flows,” Determinants and Systemic Consequences of
International Capital Flows, A Study by the Research Department of the International Monetary
Fund, Occasional Paper 77, chap. 1, (Washington D.C.: March 1991), pp. l-45.
21Michael Howell and Angela Cozzini, “New Risks and New Products,” International
Equity Flows, 1990 Ed., (London: Salomon Brothers, August 1990), p. 13.16
the largest volume of trading. Interest rate swaps help integrate short- and long-term
markets denominated in a particular currency. Currency swap contracts, in which two
counterparties agree to exchange payment streams denominated in two different currencies
over time, help integrate financial markets denominated in different currencies.
This statistical sketch of large and increasing international financial flows suggests a
high degree of international financial activity, but it does not clearly indicate the degree of
financial integration that has been achieved. Moreover, even if comprehensive and reliable
statistics on gross international capital flows and derivative transactions were available, they
could shed only limited light on the extent of international financial integration.
Increasing international asset price integration
As markets become more highly integrated, asset prices often adjust in anticipation of
capital flows that would otherwise occur. Indeed, it is possible to imagine a perfectly
integrated international market in which capital never actually flows from one market to
another. Instead, market participants adjust equilibrium prices instantaneously to new
information because transactors know that they would experience losses if they were to
conduct transactions at the preceding price. If prices do not diverge from equilibrium
levels, no arbitrage flows will take place. Thus an additional way of evaluating the extent
of international financial integration is to measure the extent of asset price integration.
Figure 11 summarizes five different degrees of international financial integration as
reflected by asset prices starting from the most superficial level extending to the deepest
level. Each level will be considered in turn to measure how deeply international financial
integration has progressed.17
Figure 11. Five Levels of International Financial Integration18
Figure 11 continued
Definitions of Symbols
the Eurodollar rate on a Eurodollar deposit that matures in one year.
a nondollar Eurocurrency rate on a nondollar-denominated Eurocurrency deposit
that matures in one year.
the forward premium stated as the difference between dollar price of a unit of
foreign currency for delivery in one year less the dollar price of a unit of
foreign currency for spot delivery scaled by the spot price of foreign currency.
the national interest rate in country x on an instrument that is comparable in all
other respects to the Eurocurrency deposit denominated in the same currency.
the speculative premium stated as the expected dollar price of a unit of foreign
currency in one year less the actual dollar price of a unit of foreign currency for
spot delivery, scaled by the spot price of foreign currency.
the anticipated annual percentage change in the price index of country x.
the real (inflation-adjusted) interest rate in country x for a one year maturity.
omits a term. For precision, the product of the real interest rate and the
anticipated inflation rate should also be included.19
Covered Interest Parity in the Eurocurrency Market
The first and most superficial level of international financial integration is integration
of the offshore markets -- covered interest rate parity among Eurocurrency deposits. This
implies that, when adjusted for the cost of protecting against a change in the foreign
exchange rate (the forward premium), investors receive precisely the same return regardless
of the denomination of Eurocurrency deposit they choose to hold. For example, if interest
parity holds, investors will earn the same return whether they invest in a Eurodollar deposit
or instead, convert dollars into sterling, invest in a Eurosterling deposit of comparable
maturity and simultaneously sell the sterling proceeds in the forward market for dollars
(thus locking-in a dollar-sterling exchange rate in advance).
25 Several studies have shown
that forward exchange rates have remained at interest-rate parity with respect to
Eurocurrency interest rates since the mid-1960s. 
26,
27 The highly integrated Eurocurrency
markets offered large, sophisticated international investors and borrowers an important
alternative to national markets that were often highly regulated and insulated from other
national markets and the international market by capital controls.20
Interest rate parity holds in the Eurocurrency markets because Eurocurrency deposits
are nearly ideal vehicles for interest arbitrage. Four features explain why arbitrage is so
effective in integrating the Eurocurrency markets. First, arbitrage need not be inhibited by
differences in credit risk. Eurocurrency deposits issued by a particular bank in different
currency denominations have equal credit risk. Moreover, they are free of taxes, sinking
fund or call provisions that complicate comparisons of returns among other assets. Second,
Eurocurrency rates are market-determined and so they fully reflect prevailing market
conditions, unlike administered interest rates or interest rates subject to regulatory ceilings
or floors. Third, the Eurocurrency markets are free from capital controls and other
restrictions that have often inhibited arbitrage between national markets. Fourth, the
Eurocurrency markets share a negligible and equal vulnerability to future capital controls.
Even a country that is inclined to impose capital controls on transactions denominated in its
own currency lacks incentive to regulate securities denominated in foreign currencies
because Eurocurrency activities can readily shift to another center. Moreover, a country is
especially unlikely to have a motive to discriminate among Eurocurrency deposits
denominated in different foreign currencies and so all Eurocurrencies share the same low
risk of future controls.
28
Integration of offshore and Onshore Markets:21
Offshore markets have been integrated since the early days of the Eurocurrency
market, but integration of offshore and onshore markets has been a more sporadic, uneven
development. Capital controls and domestic bank regulations have often separated
Eurocurrency markets from the corresponding national markets. Two historical examples
suggest the importance of these restrictions.
The first example illustrates the importance of controls on capital inflows designed to
keep a strong currency from becoming stronger. In figure 12, the relationship between the
Euromark rate and the German interbank rate is graphed from January 1973 through
December 1974. Until January 1974, the German authorities attempted to discourage
capital inflows through a variety of means including a 60 percent marginal reserve
requirement on bank liabilities to foreigners and a 50 percent cash deposit ratio on foreign
borrowing.
29 The result was that the Euromark rate diverged markedly below the internal
German rate even though it remained at interest parity with respect to the Eurodollar rate.
The effectiveness of these controls on capital inflows in separating the internal and external
market was especially apparent when the German mark came under speculative attack
during March 1973. The onshore rate rose above 10 percent while the offshore rate fell
below negative 2 percent. Foreigners expected such a large appreciation of the mark that
they were willing to pay more than 2 percent to hold mark-denominated assets offshore.
But when Germany removed capital controls during January 1974 the offshore and onshore
mark-denominated rates became virtually identical.
29If capital controls were merely taxes on cross-border flows it would be possible to
identify a precise wedge between interest rates in the onshore and offshore markets. But in
Germany, as in most other countries that have imposed capital controls, tax-like regulations
were combined with quantitative limitations on some activities. Since it is also very difficult
to know how capital controls function in practice, it is usually not possible to specify a precise,
meaningful arbitrage band.22
The second example illustrates the importance of controls on capital outflows intended
to support a weak currency. In figure 13, the Eurofranc rate is graphed alongside the
domestic French rate to illustrate the impact of controls on capital outflows on the
differential between offshore and onshore rates. Capital controls were maintained in France
for one and a half decades longer than in Germany; indeed, they were tightened
substantially early in the Mitterand regime. Regulation of trade credits, however, was
sufficiently loose so that the internal and external money markets moved together relatively
tightly unless the franc was under speculative attack.
30 During speculative periods, in
contrast, the controls were binding and the speculative demand for franc-denominated loans
caused the Eurofranc rate to rise far above the internal French rate. The speculative attack
against the franc during March 1983 provides a good example. The differential between
the external and internal franc rate rose above 9 percent.
31  When France removed capital
controls as a prelude to entering the European Community’s single market in financial
services, the offshore and onshore franc-denominated rates merged.
Covered Interest Parity Among National Rates:
By 1993 offshore money markets have been integrated with onshore money markets
in most industrial countries. For large, sophisticated transactors the Eurocurrency markets
have merged with the corresponding domestic currency markets. Capital controls were
relaxed during three different periods. With the abandonment of fixed exchange rates
30For further details, see Francesco Giavazzi and Alberto Giovannini, Limiting Exchange
Rate Flexibility: the European Monetary System, chap. 7, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
31Marston shows that the interest differential responded significantly to the anticipated
realignment of the exchange rate. Richard C. Marston, Real Interest Rates in the Group of
Five Industrial Countries: A Study of International Financial Integration, chap. 3, (Cambridge
University Press, 1994).23
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States shed their capital
controls during 1974. During 1979 the United Kingdom abandoned its capital controls and
Japan began the process of dismantling its capital controls.
32 And during 1990 France
and Italy abolished their capital controls as part of the step-by-step approach to economic
and monetary union in the European Community.
Once offshore and onshore markets became integrated, covered interest rate parity
among national rates was also achieved.
33 Since the Eurocurrency rates were at interest
rate parity and the Eurocurrency rates were equal to the corresponding national rates, the
national rates were at interest rate parity. More fundamentally, capital controls and
domestic financial regulations no longer inhibited arbitrage flows between national markets,
This third level of international financial integration permits virtually frictionless capital
mobility: investors perceive national assets insured against possible changes in exchange
rates as virtually perfect substitutes. This can happen only when all barriers between
national markets except exchange rates have become negligible. These include transactions
costs, perceptions of default risk, current capital controls, and the expectation of future
32Japanese capital controls were somewhat unusual because they applied to both inflows
and outflows of capital.24
capital controls. Frankel
34 describes these factors as the “country premium”. The
elimination of the country premium does not, however, assure that uncovered funding costs
-- those in which no exchange rate protections have been purchased -- will be the same in
all countries.
Uncovered Interest Rate Parity:
The next, deeper level of international financial integration -- uncovered interest rate
parity -- implies that the difference in nominal interest rates is equal to the anticipated
change in exchange rates. If this condition holds then expected returns on investments in
different currencies are identical when measured in the same currency. Uncovered interest
rate parity is much more difficult to verify because it incorporates a variable that is not
directly observable, the speculative exchange rate premium.
Most major countries have reached the third level of integration in which covered
interest rate parity holds. If uncovered interest rate parity also holds for these countries,
then the forward premium must equal the expected change in the exchange rate, the
Although we can compute the forward premium from
market rates, we cannot observe investors’ expectations of the corresponding speculative
premium. Consequently most tests of uncovered interest rate parity use the forward
premium as a proxy for the speculative premium and are really joint tests of two
hypotheses: (1) uncovered interest parity and (2) the efficiency of the forward premium as
34Jeffrey Frankel, “Measuring International Capital Mobility: A Review,” The American
Economic Review. vol. 82, no. 2, (May 1992), pp. 199.a forecast of the exchange rate change. Tests almost always reject the joint hypothesis.
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Most investigators infer that uncovered interest parity does not hold; but, the rejection of
the joint test could also be attributable to the inefficiency of the forward premium as a
predictor of exchange rate changes. See figure 14 for a graph of uncovered interest rates
under the naive assumption that actual exchange rates were expected by market participants.
In a recent study Marston
36 reaffirms that forward premiums (or nominal interest
differentials) are biased predictors of actual changes in exchange rates. He then employs
survey data on exchange rate expectations as a direct measure of the speculative premium
that does not depend on the assumption that the forward premium is an efficient estimate of
the speculative premium. This enables him to compute measures of the forecast error and
the risk premium. His analysis of the two series leads him to conclude that both systematic
forecast errors and time-varying exchange risk premiums cause deviations from uncovered
interest rate parity and explain why the forward premium is not equal to the speculative
premium. Uncertainty over changes in the nominal exchange rate thus precludes the major
industrial countries from reaching the fourth level of integration.
Real Interest Rate Parity:
The fifth and deepest level of integration assumes that uncovered interest parity holds
and makes the additional assumption that the expected change in the exchange rate just
offsets the anticipated inflation differential in both countries thus maintaining real exchange
361994, Chapter 4.26
rates.
37 Real interest rate parity implies that capital flows equate real interest rates across
countries and that the difference in nominal interest rates is precisely equal to the
anticipated difference in inflation rates.
38 For example, a one-year U.S. interest rate of 5
percent would be at real interest parity with a one-year Japanese interest rate of 4 percent,
if the anticipated inflation rate was 3 percent in the U.S. and 2 percent in Japan and if the
dollar was expected to depreciate relative to the yen by 1 percent. Under these
circumstances the real (inflation-adjusted) interest rate would be 2 percent in both countries.
Figure 15 shows international comparisons of real interest rates based on the
simplistic assumption that the actual inflation rate was the anticipated inflation rate. This
ex post measure of real interest spreads indicates that differences between real interest rates
are large and variable.
It is difficult to quantify the reasons for departures from real interest parity because
the relationship depends on three variables that are not directly observable -- the anticipated
inflation rates in both countries and the speculative premium. Deviations from uncovered
interest parity are clearly part of the explanation. Tests of uncovered interest parity imply
37A similar analytic framework can be found in Goldstein, Mathieson, and Lane,
“Determinants and Systemic Consequences,” pp l-45; and Frankel, “Measuring International
Capital Mobility,” pp. 197-202.27
that the forward premium is not an efficient forecaster of the expected change in the
exchange rate and so uncertainty about nominal exchange rate changes will contribute to
differences in real interest rates. But expected deviations from purchasing power parity are
also likely to be important. Many factors in addition to differences in inflation rates affect
exchange rates. Indeed, in view of the substantial deviations from purchasing power parity
that have occurred among the major currencies over the last fifteen years, it would be
surprising if international investors were not concerned about real exchange rate variability.
Real exchange rates can be as variable and uncertain as nominal exchange rates.
Summary and Implications:
The implication of the failure of real interest parity is that the current level of
international financial integration falls short of what would prevail in a truly integrated
financial market. For example, the real interest rate in one region of the United States is
likely to be virtually identical to the real interest rate in any other region of the United
States even if the regions are located three thousand miles apart. There are several obvious
barriers to flows of financial capital between nations that are of little importance inside
nations. The preceding analysis emphasizes the risk of nominal and real exchange rate
changes, but other sources of friction may also be relevant.
Although country premiums have largely disappeared for high quality, short- to
medium-term financial investments, they may still be an important inhibition to
international substitutability between long-term bonds, equities and real investments.
Information and transactions costs are higher for assets that are not traded in broad, deep,
liquid markets. Different countries have different legal systems that assign different rights
to creditors in the event that a borrower defaults; indeed, rules for winding down a failed28
business may discriminate against foreign residents.
39
And differences in tax laws may
discriminate against foreign residents.
40 Moreover, differences in language, business
traditions, disclosure laws, taxes, political traditions, macroeconomic stability and the risks
of future interferences with international capital flows become more important in
international comparisons of longer-term investments and equity than in comparisons of
short-term, nominally risk-free assets that underlie the preceding attempt to quantify the
level of financial integration.
Since international financial integration does not appear to have advanced to the
fourth level, much less the fifth level, it should not be surprising than the supply of national
savings still seems to influence the quantity of national investment. In contrast to an
integrated national financial market in which inter-regional capital flows quickly bridge
regional imbalances between savings and investment, international capital flows are
inhibited by exchange rate variability and, probably, for some categories of transactions, by
residual country premiums as well. Unlike a financial system in which real interest parity
prevails, imbalances between national savings and investment may lead to changes in the
national real interest rate. A shortfall in private savings or an increase in the government
deficit may crowd out private investment.
Studies of national savings and investment are consistent with inferences about the
level of international financial integration based on arbitrage relationships. The
39For a comparison of bankruptcy laws in the United Kingdom and the United States. see
Julian R. Frank and Walter N. Torous, “A Comparison of the U.K. and the U.S. Bankruptcy
Codes,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, vol. 6, no. 1, (Spring 1993) pp. 95-103.29
pathbreaking study by Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka
41  showed that national
savings and investment rates tend to be highly correlated. Their results have been
replicated over a wide range of countries. A number of subsequent studies have suggested
additional reasons why national savings and investment rates might be highly correlated
even if real interest parity held.
42 National savings and investment tend to respond
positively to the national income and the growth in population or productivity. Government
policy may accentuate the correlation if it attempts to limit current account surpluses by
boosting national savings. And a large country that can influence real interest rates
throughout the world will have positively correlated savings and investment even if real
interest parity holds. These factors undoubtedly contribute to the observed positive
correlation between national savings and investment. But, until real interest parity is
achieved, national investment will necessarily depend to some extent on the supply of
national savings.
Conclusion: The Extent of International Financial Integration
Our analysis of the impact of technological advances in telecommunications and
information technology showed that the costs of surmounting natural impediments to
international financial transactions have fallen sharply. Financial information flows almost
instantaneously throughout the industrial world, twenty-four hours a day. This has had an
important impact on the behavior of users of financial services, producers of financial
services and regulators of financial services.
41Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka, “Domestic Saving and International Capital
Flows,” Economic Journal, (June 1980), 90, pp. 314-29.
42See Frankel for a detailed discussion and analysis of the literature. Frankel, “Measuring
International Capital Mobility,” pp. 197-202.30
Cross-border flows of financial transactions have increased more rapidly than the
growth of income or international trade. These flows have undoubtedly tightened
international linkages between national financial markets in leading industrial countries.
The growth of cross-border flows has been supported by the international expansion of
financial institutions headquartered in leading industrial countries. Although these foreign
offices must comply with local regulations, they inevitably intensify competition and
introduce new kinds of financial products and practices which often lead to changes in local
regulations. The menu of financial choices in different national markets is consequently
becoming more similar over time. This trend has been most pronounced with regard to
large, wholesale transactions. But the same forces of innovation and technological advance
that are integrating offshore and onshore markets are also breaking down barriers within
traditionally segmented national financial markets.
International comparisons of assets returns indicate that international financial
integration has advanced to the third level in which short- to medium-term fixed income
assets insured against foreign exchange risk are virtually perfect substitutes across the
leading industrial countries. But uncertainty about movements in nominal and real
exchange rates presents an obstacle to achieving the deeper level of financial integration
that prevails within leading industrial countries. For longer-term, more heterogeneous
financial instruments, residual country premiums may also interfere with international
substitutability of otherwise comparable assets.
Large, sophisticated institutions dealing in short- to medium-term financial
instruments enjoy a degree of international financial integration that is without precedent in
the post-war era. This is in striking contrast to the tightly-insulated, heavily-controlled31
national markets that prevailed just after World War II. Even before all leading industrial
nations had achieved external convertibility, the development of the Eurocurrency markets
gave the largest investors and borrowers access to an offshore market in which covered
interest rate parity prevailed. But domestic financial regulations and capital controls
continued to impede the integration of offshore and onshore markets.
Since the 1970s the major industrial countries have liberalized their domestic financial
regulations and relaxed controls on international flows of capital. The correspondence of
the two trends was not coincidental. Growing cross-border flows put pressure on restrictive
domestic regulations and the liberalization of domestic regulations further increased
cross-border flows. These developments tended to be sporadic; but by 1990, covered
interest differentials were negligible for all major industrial countries.
Are these changes irreversible? The answer is clearly no. Indeed, it is arguable that
the world has not yet returned to the level of financial integration that prevailed in the late
19th century when real interest rates differed little across major countries.
43 Moreover, the
behavior of France in the 1980s indicates that decisions to liberalize can be reversed for at
least short periods of time.
But even though a retreat from international financial integration is possible, the costs
of withdrawing from an integrated world financial market are rising. Technological
advances have limited the scope for autonomous regulatory action that raises the cost of32
financial services. The introduction of personal computers, modems and international
direct-dial telephone systems has sharply limited a government’s options for insulating its
financial sector from the integrated international financial system. Unless a government
chooses to impose draconian controls on cross-border flows of information and people,
sophisticated transactors can readily shift from costly domestic financial services to cheaper
foreign substitutes. And controls of that degree of stringency on movements of people and
information would impose heavy costs, not just on the financial sector, but on the whole
economy. Governments may still choose to impose costly regulations, but these regulations
may no longer accomplish the policy goals they are intended to achieve.
Will the world economy proceed to higher levels of integration, ultimately
approaching real interest parity? The answer depends in part on the kind of exchange rate
system that countries choose. The policy changes that have reduced country premiums and
advanced the industrial nations to the third level of integration have required only
autonomous policy decisions to liberalize domestic financial regulations and lower capital
controls. To a considerable extent, technological advances have driven this process by
facilitating innovations that permit sophisticated transactors to evade costly regulations.
Liberalization and deregulation have as often been an admission that traditional policies no
longer work, as an attempt to achieve welfare gains from a more competitive financial
system. This process is likely to continue to integrate internal markets between maturities,
between sectors, between institutions, and between instruments to facilitate international
substitutability over a wider range of assets.
The main barrier to the next higher levels of integration, however, is exchange rate
uncertainty. Reduction of exchange rate uncertainty requires a very high degree of33
international cooperation. It cannot be accomplished by the actions of a single country.
Although groups of countries may choose to adopt a common currency -- and in mid-1993,
even the plans of the European Community in this regard seem highly uncertain -- it is
doubtful that all major countries would choose this option.
Even if international financial integration does not advance to the next higher levels,
the current level of integration raises important challenges for policy makers. The degree
of substitutability between domestic financial instruments and international alternatives is
already great enough to constrain the discretion of national policy makers with respect to
macroeconomic, regulatory and prudential policies. Other monographs in this series
consider the way in which international financial integration affects monetary policy, fiscal
policy, exchange rate policy and the regulation of multinational enterprises. This monograph
focuses on the implications of international financial integration for prudential policies --
measures designed to protect the safety and soundness of the financial system.
As we argue in Chapter 3 and 4, international financial integration affects both ex
ante policies devised to prevent threats to financial stability and ex post prudential policies
designed to limit the damage to the financial system and the real economy once a shock has
occurred. Ex ante, the authorities face increasing difficulties in monitoring the safety and
soundness of financial institutions as they become more involved in international financial
transactions. Information on foreign transactions is often more costly to obtain and
interpret. Moreover, notwithstanding the substantial potential benefits of international
diversification, financial institutions engaged in international transactions may face three
kinds of risk that do not occur in purely domestic financial transactions.
First is foreign exchange risk. Foreign exchange positions, like other speculative34
positions in assets with volatile prices, may jeopardize the solvency of an institution.
Second is transfer risk -- the possibility that residents of a particular foreign country will
be unable to pay a promised amount because the central bank on which they depend for
foreign exchange is unable or unwilling to permit local currency to be converted in the
currency in which the contract is denominated. Third is international settlement risk -- the
possibility that the quid pro quo in a foreign exchange transaction that an institution paid
out earlier in the Greenwich-mean-time day will not be received when the relevant market
settles later in the Greenwich-mean-time day.
44 This risk arises from the fact of multiple
time zones.
After a shock to the solvency of an important financial institution has occurred --
either because of the realization of a foreign risk or a traditional domestic risk -- the
authorities may experience greater difficult in organizing an effective response when
markets are highly integrated internationally. An effective, ex post response may require
cooperation among national authorities in several different countries to gather information
and perhaps to perfect collateral and provide resources. Moreover, the increased capital
mobility that has accompanied deeper international financial integration means that the
authorities have a much shorter time to perceive and react to a shock. And, the acceleration
of financial innovation that has gone along with greater international financial integration
has increased the complexity of interconnections among financial market participants. This
makes it more difficult to implement an effective, ex post prudential policy if an important
market participant were to fail. We shall address these aspects of international financial
integration in the chapters which follow.
44This intra-day risk is sometimes know as “Herstatt risk” (see Chapter 3).References
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